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Abstract
Over the years there have been many interpretations of what constitutes Information Terrorism. This paper
examines the correlation/relationship between Information Warfare and Terrorism, and describes what is
considered to be Information Terrorism now. It achieves this by outlining the threat’s impact, advantage and
capability. It then examines the positives that can be derived from such and, based on the literature available
on the subject, provides a deduced interpretation of what Information Terrorism is. The paper concludes with
remarks supporting the assertion that Information Terrorism is a major dynamic and asymmetric threat
contributing to a new national security environment.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
This paper provides a review of literature to inform delegates of what constitutes Information Terrorism and
the threat that pertains to it.
In essence, it is surmised that a consequence of the prompt evolution in Information Terrorism is the inability
of nation states to respond quickly to such, which has been their approach up till now for countering
terrorism. This puts nations in a defensive mode where they are impacting heavily on their own society. It
also means it has become hard for nations to communicate worldwide and influence large geographical
populaces in a globalised society. The traditional law enforcement model used is also not proving an effective
strategy for addressing terrorist conduct of Information Warfare (IW) and the flexibility provided by means
such as the Internet is making countermeasures difficult (Deeks, Berman, Brenner & Lewis 2005).
The summation above highlights a whole new capability/advantage for groups considering Information
Terrorism, thereby burgeoning the new security environment.

THE THREAT
According to Schwartau (2001, p.4) “asymmetry is what gives terrorists their strength”. Therefore, combine
the asymmetric threats of terrorism and IW, and a hybrid form of asymmetric warfare is ‘Information
Terrorism’. Considering that, as contended by Wilson (2005), recent terrorist events have produced the
effects of tighter physical and border security then terrorists have a reason to more heavily engage in
Information Terrorism to achieve their aims and infiltrate nation states.
A review of literature reveals that many definitions of Information Terrorism exist. However, irrespective of
an agreed definition, Libicki (1995) claims Information Terrorism has its advantages, as it allows effective
terrorism by directing itself against very specific targets, even if carried out infrequently, from remote and
often anonymous locations.
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Another perspective given is that Information Terrorism can be called ‘cyber terrorism’. This is because, as
explained by Furnell (2001), ‘cyber terrorists’ are terrorists who employ hackertype techniques to threaten or
attack information systems, networks, and/or data”. Clarifying this relationship, Furnell (2001, p.41) asserts
that, “as with other forms of terrorism, cyber terrorist activities are conducted in the name of a particular
political or social agenda to intimidate or coerce another party (e.g. a government)”.
The relationship between IW and terrorism is broadened because the terrorists’ sought after effect is achieved
by conducting Information Terrorism even though information system abuse does not necessarily result in
direct violence against humans (Devost, Houghton & Pollard, 2002). Although, as physical violence is a
necessary component of terrorism then many acts of criminal computer abuse may not be considered
terroristic if they do not result in direct physical violence. Further to this, Devost et al (2002) contend that as
technology’s implications broaden on society and politics then the outcome of terrorist action in this field
will achieve greater effect.
This view is supported to some extent by Jones, Kovacich and Luzwick (2002) who argue that the action of
terrorism is to cause ‘terror’ to the people and for this reason it is difficult, given the current state of
information technological advancement, for Information Terrorism to be effective. They clarify this by noting
this will change as cultural values change and society becomes more dependent on technology. Therefore, at
the very least and in anticipation of this change, the social and political definitions of terrorism should
likewise broaden to accommodate Information Terrorism, and the current semantic vacuum of a universally
accepted comprehensive definition suggests that IW is a probable new facet of terrorist activity (Devost et al,
2002).
Underlying this conclusion is Hoffman (in Weimann, 2006) who outlines that one of the enduring axioms of
terrorism is that it exists to attract attention and uses publicity to communicate its message. In the past, this
has been relatively restricted because weapons to do this consisted mainly of guns and bombs. However,
today terrorists no longer have this restriction because the modern terrorist’s arsenal includes computers, CD
burners, email accounts, the Internet and the World Wide Web.

THE THREAT IMPACT
Many countries heavily use information systems to manage and operate critical services. Electricity, gas,
water, sewerage and other services are now highly automated and computerised. These systems, in addition to
banking, defence, government, telecommunications and transportation systems, form part of a society’s
critical information infrastructure (Armstrong, 2001). Such systems have been major terrorist targets in the
past, and now that they are automated and more critical to society than before makes them increasingly
vulnerable and attractive.
Additionally, as attested by Wilson (2005), the computer networks that operate a nation’s critical
infrastructures now represent the nation’s ‘underbelly’. However, the software that operates them has proven
vulnerable to attack through cyber crime, viruses, worms and other malicious code. Increasing the impact of
an attack such as this is another observation made by Wilson. He claims that, because of the
interdependencies among infrastructure sectors, a large scale cyber attack that affects one sector may also
have disruptive, unpredictable and perhaps devastating effects on other sectors, and possibly longlasting
effects to the national economy. It is considered that this example would apply to most nations.
Hinde (2001) confirms the existence of the Information Terrorism threat in this regard by noting that shortly
after the major physical terrorist attacks of 2001 in the US there were immediate concerns from data security
experts that coordinated cyberattacks might be launched against the telecommunications grid, which was
already overloaded and slow because of the heavy demand caused by the physical attacks.
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This assertion is supported by Bayliss, Wirtz, Cohen and Gray (2002) who claim policymakers now fear that
nonstate actors conducting terrorism (Terrorist Groups) will conduct electronic raids on vital national
systems controlled by computers. They allege that fear is no longer based on the prospect of violence because
information and the ability to control it has become a form of power, thereby amplifying the status of
Information Terrorism. Another observation made by them is that terrorist cells can now share information
and coordinate action without a hierarchical organisation that is vulnerable to penetration and subversion.
Consequently, Information Terrorism appears to have become one of the unintended consequences of the
‘Information revolution’ and society’s increased interconnectivity (Henych, Holmes & Mesloh, 2003).
The new situation is described by Dearth (2001, p.67) who states:
“Advanced societies are moving to a new place; call it the ‘infosphere’ or ‘Cyberspace’. In the
journey to this new place, humankind will bring with it old impulses and needs: the need to connect,
to converse, to share intimacies, to conduct commerce…will also bring with it the impulse to
violence, conflict and war.”
This observation conjures several scenarios of Information Terrorism. These include altering formulas for
medication at pharmaceutical plants, ‘crashing’ telephone systems, misrouting passenger trains, and
disrupting operations of air traffic control.
Jones et al (2002) give another dimension to the Information Terrorism threat, in the form of denial of service
attacks. They explain that when a terrorist group cannot achieve its objective by physical means then it has
the potential to gain the desired impact by using the Internet and the connectivity of other systems that the
target audience relies upon. This is done by preventing legitimate users of a service from using that service,
which can be done in a number of ways. This includes network flooding, disrupting connections and systems,
and preventing direct access. Terrorists can also do this relatively anonymously and without much effort from
themselves, which provides further advantages. Considering that many critical infrastructures now interact
electronically with users this brings further frightening scenarios.
Information Terrorism can also, directly or subconsciously, be used in conjunction with or to supplement
physical acts of terror, thereby magnifying the desired impact. This conclusion is implied by Emery (2005),
who outlines that wherever human activity occurs physically such activity also takes place simultaneously in
the information dimension. This means it is important to recognise that the residual effect from physical
actions taken will shape the information environment. Additionally, Emery notes that because terrorists can
not engage a superior force in the physical environment they conduct selected acts in the physical
environment, such as bombings and small scale attacks, to shape the information environment. These acts can
help achieve objectives in the information environment and, ultimately, in the physical environment.
Therefore, terrorists who lack military parity achieve their ultimate objectives by being successful in the
information environment, and this highlights the effectiveness and reasoning for Information Terrorism.
Additionally, Wilson (2005) asserts that many security experts agree that a cyber attack would be most
effective if it were used to amplify a conventional terrorist attack.
Evidence of the probable conduct of IW by terrorists was highlighted by Richard Clarke (Clarke 2003, p.1),
the former US Presidential Adviser for Cyberspace Security, who noted that:
“…investigators have accumulated intelligence about Al Qaeda's interests and skills in using
cyberspace to launch an attack. Many experts believe terrorists could likely combine such a cyberbased disruption with a real-world physical attack to amplify the impact. We're troubled by the fact
that a number of people related to Al Qaeda -- including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was
recently arrested and was the chief operating officer... have [a] technical background. Recently, a
student at the University of Idaho was arrested by the FBI for alleged terrorist connections, and he
was studying in a PhD program on cyber security. So, I think, similarly to the fact that some of the
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Sept. 11 hijackers had training in flight training, some of the people that we're seeing now related to
Al Qaeda had training in computer security.”
Clarke, only a year before and contrary to the above testimony, is cited via Conway (2003, p.39) saying he did
not like to use the words’ cyber terrorism because “most terrorists have not engaged in information warfare
(read ‘cyber terrorism’). Instead, he admits, terrorist groups at this stage have only used the internet for
propaganda, communications and fundraising”. This gives some idea of the threat’s prompt evolution.
Based on the plethora of terrorist websites and their use of propaganda, many terrorist groups now have a
profound understanding of the information environment and the ability to more effectively use such (Farrell,
2005). Terrorists have a whole new field of action because most aspects of living today are dependent on
information networks. Exacerbating this is that even though the technology to operate and protect networks
can be quite costly it is relatively cheap to attack them (Emery, Earl & Buettner, 2004). Shahar
(2003).explains that, in the simplest case, only a computer, a modem and a willing hacker is needed, and with
university education now globally accessible then terrorists have easy access to these means. Even if they do
not, mercenary hackers are available to do the job for the right price.
Enhancing the future impact of Information Terrorism is that new technologies will pose new risks and
demand new responses to those risks. This includes terrorist usage of information for attacking nations
(Anderson, 1999). Clarifying this effect and possible change required for national security is an indirect
example given by Schwartau (2001, p.2), who cites that:
“While Western Militaries struggle for a decade on average to acquire new weapons, a country
with commercially available computer equipment and less rigorous democratic and accounting
processes could field new systems within a few years. It is the stuff of military nightmares.”
Also of particular interest is that terrorism has been rooted consistently in Chinese society with no lapses in
operation like much of the rest of the world (Thomas, 2004). Considering China is a prominent nation and
now the world’s largest supplier of information equipment, and the momentum and techniques of its
information industry is increasing, further reasons to justify the increasing relationship between terrorism and
IW are evident.

The Threat Capability
A primary enabler of Information Terrorism is the Internet, which is a reason for the current transition into a
globalised society. While the Internet is a creation of the West, it is also attractive to terrorists for some of the
same reasons it is attractive to society generally. It may be used anonymously so identity is masked; it is
global, which allows access to huge audiences around the world; and it is inexpensive and subject to little
regulation. Therefore, the Internet enables global terrorism (Deeks et al, 2005). Consequently, terrorist
groups appear to be using it to their advantage.
Confirming this observation, Thomas (2005, pp.3444) in discussing terrorist methodologies, identifies 16
measures for consideration, as the Internet:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

can be used to put together profiles;
access can be controlled or its use directed according to the server configuration, thus
creating a true ideological weapon;
can be used anonymously, or as a shell game to hide identities;
produces an atmosphere of virtual fear or virtual life;
can help a poorly funded group to raise money;
is an outstanding command and control mechanism;
is a recruiting tool;
is used to gather information on potential targets;
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

puts distance puts distance between those planning the attack and their targets;
can be used to steal information or manipulate data;
can be used to send hidden messages;
allows groups with few resources to offset even some huge propaganda machines in
advanced countries;
can be used to disrupt business;
can mobilise a group or Diaspora, or other hackers to action;
takes advantage of legal norms; and
can be used to divert attention from a real attack scenario.

These measures highlight the value of the Internet to groups conducting terrorism. Weimann (2006), who
monitored and archived terrorist Web sites for eight years, validates this by explaining that terrorists are now
clearly using the Internet for fundraising and recruitment, training and instruction, propaganda and
psychological warfare, and for gathering opensource information to plan attacks.
The degree of Information Terrorism capability is given by Deeks et al (2005) who note that terrorist groups
are now using the information means available to form an ideological platform that precondition its audience
to respond to subsequent solicitations of financial support and entreaties to undertake violent operations. In
addition to conditioning the minds of participants to accept acts of murder and destruction as politically
expedient and morally acceptable, they explain that the electronic forms of communications used actively
encourages participants to undertake such acts. They also note that terrorists are even taking advantage of
charitable organisations to directly solicit support, and to collect funds and resources. They are also
perpetrating online crimes such as identity and credit card theft. In regard to the latter, cyber crime has
increased dramatically over the past few years with several recent terrorist events funded partially through
online credit card fraud (Wilson, 2005).
As Alexander and Swetnam (2001) highlight, the capability of terrorist groups to conduct IW is occurring on
all fronts. On the nontechnical (soft) side transnational terrorist groups are becoming increasingly
empowered by media outlets that present their position unaltered and unfiltered by governments or
communication laws. They are using cellular phones, the Internet, and alternate news sources to do this. On
the technical (hard) side, a growing danger is terrorists’ slow but steady acquisition of digitally enhanced
miniaturised technologies. Therefore, the ‘information or cyber’ age has enormously increased the
capabilities of terrorists (Thomas, 2005).
The whole spectrum of IW is now a definitive capability for terrorist groups, as all the elements can be used
and in combination with each other (Thomas, 2005). Additionally, as noted by Wilson (2005), terrorist group
links with hackers and cyber criminals is adding to their skills, and finances obtained through drug
trafficking may also provide terrorists with access to highly skilled computer programmers.
In effect, terrorist groups are becoming technically sophisticated and years of publicity about information
security weaknesses have made them more aware of the vulnerabilities of nation states. Terrorists and their
symphasisers are already embedded in societies with a large information technology workforce (Wilson,
2005) and the observations made above infer that the human aspects of IW must be considered when
discussing Information Terrorism.
The human aspect includes the central part the Internet is playing in the battle for ‘hearts and minds’ (due to
the global, easy and widespread accessibility of this form of information transmission). This is particularly
apt, as terrorists attempt to influence their will upon people. Their threat to societies and states is more about
the adverse psychological influence they cause rather than the physical damage they inflict (Radvanyi, 1990;
Casciani, 2004).
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The increasing capability and desire by terrorists to conduct IW is evident. A real example is given by Wilson
(2005) in the form of a well distributed and publicised book by Iman Samundra, who was convicted and is
now awaiting execution for his part in the 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali. In this book, Samundra advocates
that Muslim youth actively develop hacking skills, and names several websites and chat rooms as sources for
increasing these skills. He also urges Muslim youth to conduct credit card fraud to fund the cause. While it is
acknowledged that Muslim youth generally will not follow this advice there are some who may be inclined to
do so and this increases the capacity of this particular terrorist movement.
An outlook given by Post, Ruby and Shaw (2000) adds a further dimension to this capability. They outline
that what is avant garde now will become mainstream in the next five to ten years as youth who have been
socialised on computers join terrorist groups. Therefore, there is every reason to believe the reliance on
information technology will become increasingly routinised and IW tactics will become incorporated in all
terrorist operations. Post et al (2000) clarify this by explaining that the rapidity with which information
technology is integrated will depend primarily on the group’s sociopolitical context and the degree to which
utilising it facilitates the group’s cause. Additionally, Information Terrorism is likely to emerge among anti
establishment groups who perceive technological resources to be a source of vulnerability to their opponent
or to be important to their opponent’s efforts against them, and this creates a gambit of terrorist possibilities.

The Threat Advantage
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) contest that not only has the information environment increased the types of
targets and weapons for those wanting to conduct terrorism, but it has also provided more ways for these
parties to better operate and structure themselves, thereby placing them at an advantage. They explain that not
only has the world embraced an increased access to information, so it can operate more efficiently and with
greater flexibility, but terrorists have harnessed this power to enable new operational doctrines and forms of
organisations. Therefore, they are empowered to conduct IW.
This ability to conduct Information Terrorism is elevated by groups considering terrorism who are
‘disaggregating’ from hierarchical bureaucracies, and moving to flatter, more decentralised webs of groups
united by a common purpose. This has brought a whole new dimension and set of capabilities (Ibid).
This advantage also introduces the relatively untouched dimension of ‘netwars’, which has practice ahead of
theory. The ‘information’ revolution favours the rise of network forms of organisations and these appear to be
the next major form of organisation after tribes, hierarchies and markets. This form is redefining societies,
and in doing so, the nature of conflict and cooperation. Resultantly, networkbased conflict and crime is a
major future phenomenon (Ibid).
Furthermore, as Thomas (2005) outlines, symbolic leadership, which is instrumental to such organisations, is
being magnified by using the Internet and other forms of information transmission. This appears to be
placing terrorist groups at further advantage by conducting IW. He uses Osama bin Laden, the alleged leader
of the alQaeda terrorist group, as an example. Thomas explains that bin Laden is an expert at buttressing
Arab opinion with his TV and Internet messages that touch the souls and spirits of exasperated Arabs. He is a
credible figure to many, as he extols alQaeda successes, gives directives and offers moral support. The media
and international communication stations often pick up these broadcasts and replay parts of them to the
public. Thomas emphasises that while bin Laden relays his message, as any leader should, the nation states
are slow to respond because they are busy deciphering the message and trying to substantiate its authenticity.
In the meantime, he moves onto his next planning phase.
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THE THREAT POSITIVES
Also worth considering from a positive aspect of national security is that factors that can be used to counter
Information Terrorism have evolved but are not yet generally publicised. An example is given by Weimann
(2006), who argues that, despite the multiplicity and diversity of terrorist websites, there are nonetheless core
and common characteristics that terrorist groups with a presence on the Internet share. As Weimann explains,
most terrorist sites are particularly notable for their colourful, welldesigned and visually arresting graphic
content, selective presentation of information, and effective message. Other common elements include
descriptions of the given terrorist group’s history, its aims and objectives, and the depredations inflicted by
an enemy state/s or people/s upon who/what the terrorists purport to represent. Much other information such
as biographies of leaders, maps, photos and communiqués are also on the sites. Weimann concludes that,
virtually without exception, all terrorist sites studiously avoid drawing attention to the violence or destruction
that the group is responsible for. Instead, issues such as freedom of expression and human rights are used,
and this indirectly suggests the psychological warfare purpose of Information Terrorism.
Regardless of the example above being confined solely to the Internet, this observation highlights that
messages for improving the awareness of Information Terrorism and how to counter it exist when examining
the positive indicators. Additionally, as Smith (2005) and Deeks et al (2005) imply, the approach taken can be
changed by exploiting the increased information ability that has been created by nations, thereby placing
nations at an advantage, and by winning the debate on aspects such as the Internet rather than by trying to
suppress it. These are all worthwhile considerations for national security and enhance the importance of the
intelligence function.
Another positive consideration for national security is given by Post et al (2000). They identify that, in
contrast to the powerful group dynamics of traditional terrorist groups, those groups relying upon networked
organisational structures and computermediated communications are subject to virtual group dynamics,
which significantly affects their decisionmaking and risktaking. This especially applies to those who may
only be in contact electronically. It also implies that groups conducting Information Terrorism have serious
security implications within themselves also.
Irrespective of these potential national advantages and vide Emery (2005), it is clear that terrorists compared
to nation states have now adopted a much different strategy to achieve victory for their cause. They are now
using a complex information operations strategy that, considering their circumstances, is more effective,
efficient and efficacious than previous forms of operations. This has become an enabler for IW and, “as
information systems increasingly form the underpinnings of modern society, terrorist attacks using tools of
the information revolution and targeting information systems will become prevalent” (Post et al, p.119).

CONCLUDING REMARKS
As this paper highlights, the topic of Information Terrorism is diverse and relatively new in its nature.
However, after reviewing the applicable literature, the conduct of Information Terrorism is interpreted as:
A non-state actor’s premeditated and asymmetrical warlike conduct of information
activities to fulfil their ethos, foster mass acts of terror and/or affect and disrupt the
security and/or well-being of a nation or series of nations. This is done to:
•

appropriately effect and manage a change in a target audience’s perception;

•

market philosophical propaganda so a target public’s governance, livelihood
and will is influenced through fear;
operate advantageously, efficiently, effectively and efficaciously; and
preserve themselves from activities by allies, competitors and adversaries.

•
•
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This paper also implies that the threat of Information Terrorism is contributing to a new security
environment, and a plethora of commentators reviewed in the literature, many of which are given in this
paper, espouse a whole range of solutions to intervene and counter this threat. However, this observation
intimates the complexity and nature of the overall problem of Information Terrorism, which is a major
determinant for the new security environment. Despite this, it is noticeable that a large number of authors
argue that, irrespective of what viewpoint they hold, solutions such as a humanitarian convention need to be
considered. This infers a preference to just plain aggression and force, which many authors contend is the
current approach. It also suggests that, due to the information capacity of the word today, IW itself be
employed to counter Information terrorism, as it not only addresses the threat holistically but can be done
immediately and expediently considering the capacity of nation states countering terrorism.
However, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) and Rogers (2000) explain that there are two main obstacles to
this challenge and to countering terrorism generally. The first, and by far the most substantial in their eyes, is
that the necessary response will involve considerable limits being placed on wealth and power of the elite
global minority, thereby requiring radical economic and political changes that are substantially greater than
anything previously experienced. The second is that most thinking and writing on international security is
deeply ethnocentric and conservative.
Information Terrorism in the new security environment has provided a new dimension and complicates
overcoming these obstacles whether IW is used by nation states or not to counter terrorism generally. This
highlights a dilemma facing the world.
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